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Introduction
For many employees, "work" is no longer something performed while sitting at 
a computer in an office. Employees in a growing number of industries are expected to 
carry mobile devices and be available for work-related interactions even when beyond 
the workplace and outside of normal business hours. In this article it is argued that 
a future step will increasingly be to move work-related information and communica-
tion technology (ICT) inside the human body through the use of neuroprosthetics, to 
create employees who are always "online" and connected to their workplace’s digital 
ecosystems. At present, neural implants are used primarily to restore abilities lost 
through injury or illness, however their use for augmentative purposes is expected to 
grow, resulting in populations of human beings who possess technologically altered 
capacities for perception, memory, imagination, and the manipulation of physical 
environments and virtual cyberspace. Such workers may exchange thoughts and 
share knowledge within posthuman cybernetic networks that are inaccessible to 
unaugmented human beings.
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Scholars note that despite their potential benefits, such neuroprosthetic devices may 
create numerous problems for their users, including a sense of alienation, the threat 
of computer viruses and hacking, financial burdens, and legal questions surrounding 
ownership of intellectual property produced while using such implants. Moreover, 
different populations of human beings may eventually come to occupy irreconcilable 
digital ecosystems as some persons embrace neuroprosthetic technology, others feel 
coerced into augmenting their brains to compete within the economy, others might 
reject such technology, and still others will simply be unable to afford it.
In this text we propose a model for analysing how particular neuroprosthetic devices 
will either facilitate human beings’ participation in  new forms of socioeconomic 
interaction and digital workplace ecosystems–or undermine their mental and physi-
cal health, privacy, autonomy and authenticity. We then show how such a model can 
be used to create device ontologies and typologies that help us classify and under-
stand different kinds of advanced neuroprosthetic devices according to the impact 
that they will have on individual human beings.
From Neuroprosthetic Devices to Posthuman 
Digital-Physical Ecosystems
Existing Integration of the Human Brain with Work-Related 
Digital-Physical Ecosystems
In recent decades the integration of the human brain with work-related digital eco-
systems has grown stronger and increasingly complex. Whereas once employees were 
expected to use desktop computers during "working hours," for a growing number of 
employees it is now expected that they be available for work-related interactions at all 
times through their possession and mastery of mobile (and now, wearable) devices 
(Shih 2004; Gripsrud 2012). Along this path of ever closer human-technological 
integration, an emerging frontier is that of moving computing inside the human 
body through the use of implantable computers (Koops & Leenes 2012; Gasson 2012; 
McGee 2008).
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The Potential of Neuroprosthetic Implants for Human 
Enhancement
One particular type of implantable computer is a neuroprosthetic device (or neural 
implant) designed to provide a human being with some sensory, cognitive, or motor 
capacity (Lebedev 2014). Such neuroprostheses are currently used primarily for 
therapeutic purposes, to restore abilities that have been lost due to injury or illness. 
However, researchers have already developed experimental devices designed for pur-
poses of human enhancement that allow an individual to exceed his or her natural 
biological capacities by, for example, obtaining the ability to perceive ultrasonic 
waves or store digitized computer files within one’s body (Warwick 2014; Gasson 
2012; McGee 2008).
Toward Posthuman Digital-Physical Ecosystems
The use of neuroprosthetics for purposes of human enhancement is expected to grow 
over the coming decades, resulting in  a  segment of the population whose minds 
possess unique kinds of sensory perception, memory, imagination, and emotional 
intelligence and who participate in social relations that are mediated not through the 
exchange of traditional oral, written, or nonverbal communication but by neurotech-
nologies that allow the sharing of thoughts and volitions directly with other human 
minds and with computers (McGee 2008; Warwick 2014; Rao, Stocco, Bryan, Sarma, 
Youngquist, Wu, & Prat 2014).
Until now, communicating a thought to another mind has required the thought to 
be expressed physically as a social action that is audible, visible, or tangible in nature, 
however future neuroprosthetics may facilitate the exchange of ideas directly at the 
level of thought (Warwick 2014; Rao et  al. 2014; Gladden 2015d), thereby allow-
ing the creation of human networks that can be understood as either "supersocial" 
or "postsocial" in nature. Not only might such posthuman (Ferrando 2013) digital 
ecosystems be inaccessible to those who lack the appropriate form of neural augmen-
tation, but even their very existence may be invisible to unmodified human beings.
In this text, we will often refer to such ecosystems as "digital" to emphasise the fact 
that they may utilize an immersive cyberspace or other artificial environment as 
a virtualized locus for socioeconomic interaction. However, it should be kept in mind 
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that any such virtual reality is always grounded in and maintained by the computa-
tional activity of electronic or biological physical substrates; thus technically, digital 
ecosystems should always be understood as "digital-physical" ecosystems.
The Need to Analyse Neuroprosthetics from Cybernetic, 
Phenomenological, and Existentialist Perspectives
As a bidirectional gateway, a neural implant not only aids one’s mind to reach out to 
explore the world and interact with other entities; it may also allow external agents or 
systems to reach into one’s mind to access–and potentially manipulate or disrupt–one’s 
most intimate mental processes (Gasson 2012: 15–16). This makes it essential that 
manufacturers who produce such devices, policymakers who can encourage or ban their 
adoption, and users in whom they will be implanted be able to understand the positive 
and negative impacts of particular neuroprosthetic devices on individual users. This calls 
for the development of device ontologies and typologies for classifying and understand-
ing neuroprostheses that do not simply focus on  the devices’ technical characteristics 
but which also consider a user’s lived experience of a neuroprosthetic device and which 
integrate a cybernetic analysis of "control and communication" (Wiener 1961) with phe-
nomenological and even existentialist perspectives (Gladden 2015d).
Existing Ontologies and Typologies of Neuroprosthetic Devices
Existing typologies for neuroprosthetics are primarily functional. For example, 
a neuroprosthetic device can be classified based on the nature of its interface with 
the brain’s neural circuitry [sensory, motor, bidirectional sensorimotor, or cognitive 
(Lebedev 2014)], its purpose [for restoration, diagnosis, identification, or enhance-
ment (Gasson 2012: 25)], or its location [non-invasive, partially invasive, or invasive 
(Gasson 2012: 14)]. Typologies have also been developed that classify a neuropro-
sthesis according to whether it aids its human user to interact with a real physical 
environment using his or her natural physical body, augments or replaces the user’s 
natural physical body (e.g., with robotic prosthetic limbs), or allows the user to sense 
and manipulate some virtual environment (Gladden 2015b).
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Formulating Our Model for an Ontology of 
Neuroprosthetics
Here we propose a  model for classifying and understanding neuroprosthetic 
devices especially in their role of integrating human beings into digital ecosystems, 
economies and information systems. The model comprises two main dimensions, 
of which one (impact) is further subdivided into two sub-dimensions (new capaci-
ties and detriments).
Roles of the Human User
A neuroprosthetic device affects its human user as viewed on three levels: 1) the 
human being as a sapient metavolitional agent, a unitary mind that possesses its 
own conscious awareness, memory, volition, and conscience–or "metavolitionality" 
(Gladden 2015d; Calverley 2008)–2) the human being as an embodied organism 
that inhabits and can sense and manipulate a  particular environment through 
the use of its body; and 3) the human being as a social and economic actor who 
interacts with others to form social relationships and to produce, exchange, and 
consume goods and services.
Impact: Potential New Capacities and Detriments
At each of these three levels, a neuroprosthetic device can create for its user either 
new opportunities and advantages, new threats and disadvantages, or both. Typi-
cally a neuroprosthetic device creates new opportunities for its user to participate 
in socioeconomic interaction and informational ecosystems by providing some new 
cognitive, sensory, or motor capacity. Disadvantages may take the form of a  new 
dependency on some external resource, the loss of a previously existing capability, 
a security vulnerability, or some other detriment. Because a neuroprosthetic device’s 
creation of new capacities can be independent of its creation of detriments, these ele-
ments comprise two different dimensions; however, it is simpler to treat them as two 
sub-dimensions of a single larger dimension, the device’s "impact".
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Figure 1. A multidimensional model of the impacts of neuroprosthetic devices on individual users
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Impacts Captured by Our Model
Below we present specific capacities and detriments that neuroprosthetics are 
expected to create for their users at the three levels of the human being as 1) sapient 
metavolitional agent, 2) embodied embedded organism, and 3) social and economic 
actor. These items constitute a broad universe of expected possible impacts identi-
fied by scholars; any one neuroprosthesis may generate only a small number of these 
effects, if any.
Impacts on the User as Sapient Metavolitional Agent
Neuroprosthetic devices may affect their users’ cognitive processes in ways that posi-
tively or negatively impact the ability of such persons to participate in socioeconomic 
interaction and informational ecosystems. 
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New capacities provided by neuroprosthetics may include:
 o Enhanced memory, skills, and knowledge stored within the mind (engrams). Build-
ing on current technologies tested in mice, future neuroprosthetics may offer hu-
man users the ability to create, alter, or weaken memories stored in their brains’ 
natural memory systems in  the form of engrams (Han, Kushner, Yiu, Hsiang, 
Buch, Waisman, Bontempi, Neve, Frankland, & Jossely 2009; Ramirez, Liu, Lin, 
Suh, Pignatelli, Redondo, Ryan, & Tonegawa 2013; McGee 2008; Warwick 2014: 
267). This could potentially be used not only to affect a user’s declarative knowl-
edge but also to enhance motor skills or reduce learned fears.
 o Enhanced creativity. A neuroprosthetic device may be able to enhance a mind’s 
powers of imagination and creativity (Gasson 2012: 23–24) by  facilitating pro-
cesses that contribute to creativity, such as stimulating mental associations be-
tween unrelated items. Anecdotal increases in  creativity have been reported to 
result after the use of neuroprosthetics for deep brain stimulation (Cosgrove 2004; 
Gasson 2012).
 o Enhanced emotion. A neuroprosthetic device might provide its user with more de-
sirable emotional dynamics (McGee 2008: 217). Effects on emotion have already 
been seen in devices used, e.g., for deep brain stimulation (Kraemer 2011).
 o Enhanced conscious awareness. Research is being undertaken to develop neuro-
prosthetics that would allow the human mind to, for example, extend its peri-
ods of attentiveness and limit the need for periodic reductions in consciousness 
(i.e., sleep) (Kourany 2013: 992–93).
 o Enhanced conscience. One’s conscience can be understood as one’s set of metavoli-
tions, or desires about the kinds of volitions that one wishes to possess (Calverley 
2008; Gladden 2015d); insofar as a neural implant enhances processes of memory 
and emotion (Calverley 2008: 528–34) that allow for the development of the con-
science, it may enhance one’s ability to develop, discern, and follow one’s conscience.
New impairments generated by neuroprosthetics at the level of their user’s internal 
mental processes may include:
 o Loss of agency. A neuroprosthetic device may damage the brain or disrupt its ac-
tivity in a way that reduces or eliminates the ability of its human user to possess 
and exercise agency (McGee 2008: 217). Moreover, the knowledge that this can 
occur may lead users to doubt whether their volitions are really "their own"–an 
effect that has been seen with neuroprosthetics used for deep brain stimulation 
(Kraemer: 2011).
 o Loss of conscious awareness. A neuroprosthetic device may diminish the quality 
or extent of its user’s conscious awareness, e.g., by inducing daydreaming or in-
creasing the required amount of sleep. A neuroprosthesis could potentially even 
destroy its user’s capacity for conscious awareness (e.g., by inducing a coma) but 
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without causing the death of his or her biological organism (Gladden 2015d).
 o Loss of information security for internal cognitive processes. A neuroprosthetic de-
vice may compromise the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information 
contained within its user’s mental activities (such as perception, memory, volition 
or imagination), either by altering or destroying information, making it inaccessi-
ble to the user, or making it accessible to unauthorized parties (McGee 2008: 217; 
Gladden 2015d; Gladden 2015c).
 o Inability to distinguish a real from a virtual ongoing experience. If a neuroprosthe-
sis alters or replaces its user’s sensory perceptions, it may make it impossible for 
the user to know which (if any) of the sense data that he or she is experiencing cor-
respond to some actual element of an external physical environment and which 
are "virtual" or simply "false" (McGee 2008: 221; Gladden 2015d).
 o Inability to distinguish true from false memories. If a neuroprosthetic device is able 
to create, alter, or destroy engrams within its user’s brain, it may be impossible for 
a user to know which of his or her apparent memories are "true" and which are 
"false" (i.e., distorted or purposefully fabricated) (Ramirez et al. 2013).
 o Other psychological side effects. The brain may undergo potentially harmful and 
unpredictable structural and behavioral changes as it adapts to the presence, ca-
pacities, and activities of a neuroprosthesis (McGee 2008: 215–16; Koops & Leenes 
2012: 125, 130). These effects may include new kinds of neuroses, psychoses, and 
other disorders unique to users of neuroprosthetics.
Impacts on the User as Embodied Embedded Organism 
Interacting with an Environment
Neuroprosthetic devices may affect the ways in which their users sense, manipulate, 
and occupy their environment through the interface of a physical or virtual body. New 
capacities provided might include:
 o Sensory enhancement. A neuroprosthetic device may allow its user to sense his or her 
physical or virtual environment in  new ways, either by  acquiring new kinds of raw 
sense data or new modes or abilities for processing, manipulating, and interpreting 
sense data (Warwick 2014: 267; McGee 2008: 214; Koops & Leenes 2012: 120, 126).
 o Motor enhancement. A neuroprosthetic device may give users new ways of manip-
ulating physical or virtual environments through their bodies (McGee 2008: 213; 
Warwick 2014: 266). It may grant enhanced control over one’s existing biological 
body, expand one’s body to incorporate new devices (such as an exoskeleton or vehi-
cle) through body schema engineering (Gladden 2015b), or allow the user to control 
external networked physical systems such as drones or 3D printers or virtual systems 
or phenomena within an immersive cyberworld.
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 o Enhanced memory, skills, and knowledge accessible through sensory organs (exog-
rams). A neuroprosthetic device may give its user access to external data-storage 
sites whose contents can be "played back" to the user’s conscious awareness through 
his or her sensory organs or to real-time streams of sense data that augment or 
replace one’s natural sense data (Koops & Leenes 2012: 115, 120, 126). The ability 
to record and play back one’s own sense data could provide perfect audiovisual 
memory of one’s experiences (McGee 2008: 217).
New impairments generated by neuroprosthetics at the level of their users’ physical 
or virtual bodily interfaces with their environments might include:
 o Loss of control over sensory organs. A neuroprosthetic device may deny a user di-
rect control over his or her sensory organs (Koops & Leenes 2012: 130). Techno-
logically mediated sensory systems may be subject to noise, malfunctions, and 
manipulation or forced sensory deprivation or overload occurring at the hands of 
"sense hackers" (Gladden 2015c: 201–02).
 o Loss of control over motor organs. A neuroprosthetic device may impede a user’s 
control over his or her motor organs (Gasson 2012: 14–16). The user’s body may 
no longer be capable, e.g., of speech or movement, or the control over one’s speech 
or movements may be assumed by some external agency.
 o Loss of control over other bodily systems. A  neuroprosthetic device may impact 
the functioning of internal bodily processes such as respiration, cardiac activity, 
digestion, hormonal activity, and other processes that are already affected by ex-
isting implantable medical devices (McGee 2008: 209; Gasson 2012: 12–16).
 o Other biological side effects. A neuroprosthetic device may be constructed from 
components that are toxic or deteriorate in the body (McGee 2008: 213–16), may 
be rejected by its host, or may be subject to mechanical, electronic, or software 
failures that harm their host’s organism.
Impacts on the User as Social and Economic Actor
Neuroprosthetic devices may affect the ways in which their users connect to, partici-
pate in, contribute to, and are influenced by  social relationships and structures and 
economic networks and exchange. New capacities provided might include:
 o Ability to participate in new kinds of social relations. A neuroprosthetic device may 
grant the ability to participate in new kinds of technologically mediated social rela-
tions and structures that were previously impossible, perhaps including new forms 
of merged agency (McGee 2008: 216; Koops & Leenes 2012: 125, 132) or cybernetic 
networks with utopian (or dystopian) characteristics (Gladden 2015d).
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 o Ability to share collective knowledge, skills, and wisdom. Neuroprosthetics may link 
users in a way that forms communication and information systems (McGee 2008: 
214; Koops & Leenes 2012: 128–29; Gasson 2012: 24) that can generate greater 
collective knowledge, skills, and wisdom than are possessed by  any individual 
member of the system (Wiener 1961: loc. 3070ff., 3149ff.; Gladden 2015d).
 o Enhanced job flexibility and instant retraining. By facilitating the creation, altera-
tion, and deletion of information stored in engrams or exograms, a neuropros-
thetic device may allow a user to download new knowledge or skills or instantly 
establish relationships for use in a new job (Koops & Leenes, 2012: 126).
 o Enhanced ability to manage complex technological systems. By providing a direct 
interface to external computers and mediating its user’s interaction with them 
(McGee 2008: 210), a neuroprosthesis may grant an enhanced ability to manage 
complex technological systems, e.g., for the production or provisioning of goods 
or services (McGee 2008: 214–15; Gladden 2015b).
 o Enhanced business decision-making and monetary value. By performing data min-
ing to uncover novel knowledge, executing other forms of data analysis, offering 
recommendations, and alerting the user to potential cognitive biases, a neuropros-
thesis may enhance its user’s ability to execute rapid and effective business-related 
decisions and transactions (Koops & Leenes 2012: 119). Moreover, by  storing 
cryptocurrency keys, a neuroprosthesis may allow its user to store money directly 
within his or her brain for use on demand (Gladden 2015a).
New impairments generated by neuroprosthetic devices at the level of their users’ 
socioeconomic relationships and activity might include:
 o Loss of ownership of one’s body and intellectual property. A neuroprosthetic device 
that is leased would not belong to its human user, and even a neuroprosthesis that 
has been purchased could potentially be subject to seizure in some circumstances 
(e.g., bankruptcy). Depending on the leasing or licensing terms, intellectual prop-
erty produced by a neuroprosthetic device’s user (including thoughts, memories, 
or speech) may be partly or wholly owned by the device’s manufacturer or pro-
vider (Gladden 2015d; Gladden 2015c: 164).
o Qualifications for specific professions and roles. Neuroprosthetic devices may in-
itially provide persons with abilities that enhance job performance in  partic-
ular fields (Koops & Leenes 2012: 131–32) such as computer pro-
gramming, art, architecture, music, economics, medicine, information
science, e-sports, information security, law enforcement, and the military;
as expectations for employees’ neural integration into workplace systems
grow, possession of neuroprosthetic devices may become a  requirement for
employment in  some professions (McGee 2008: 211, 214–15; Warwick 2014:
269).
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 o Creation of financial, technological or social dependencies. The user of a neuropro-
sthetic device may no longer be able to function effectively without the device 
(Koops & Leenes 2012: 125) and may become dependent on  its manufacturer 
for hardware maintenance, software updates, and data security and on  special-
ised medical care providers for diagnostics and treatment relating to the device 
(McGee 2008: 213). A user may require regular device upgrades in order to re-
main competitive in some jobs. High switching costs may make it impractical to 
shift to a competitor’s device after a user has installed an implant and committed 
to its manufacturer’s digital ecosystem.
 o Subjugation of the user to external agency. Instead of merely impeding its user’s 
ability to possess and exercise agency, a neuroprosthesis may subject its user to 
control by  some external agency. This could occur, e.g., if  the user’s memories, 
emotions, or volitions were manipulated by means of the device (Gasson 2012: 
15–16) or if the user joined with other minds to create a new form of social entity 
that possesses some shared agency (McGee, 2008: 216).
 o Social exclusion and employment discrimination. The use of detectable neuropro-
sthetics may result in shunning or mistreatment of users (Koops & Leenes 2012: 
124–25). Users of advanced neuroprosthetics may lose the ability or desire to 
communicate with human beings who lack such devices, thereby fragmenting hu-
man societies (McGee 2008: 214–16; Warwick 2014: 271) and possibly weakening 
users’ solidarity with other human beings (Koops & Leenes 2012: 127). Possession 
of some kinds of neuroprosthetic devices may exclude their users from employ-
ment in  roles where "natural," unmodified workers are considered desirable or 
even required (e.g., for liability or security reasons).
 o Vulnerability to data theft, blackmail, and extortion. A hacker, computer virus, or 
other agent may be able to steal data contained in a neuroprosthesis or use it to 
gather personal data (potentially including the contents of thoughts, memories, 
or sensory experiences) (McGee 2008: 217; Koops & Leenes 2012: 117, 130; Gas-
son 2012: 21; Gladden 2015: 167–68) that could be used for blackmail, extortion, 
corporate espionage, or terrorism.
Applying the Model: Toward a New Typology of 
Neuroprosthetics
As a test case, we can use this model to analyse one kind of neuroprosthetic device that 
is expected to become available in the future: a cochlear implant with audio recording, 
playback, upload, download, and live streaming capabilities (Koops & Leenes 2012; 
McGee 2008; Gladden 2015d). Everything that its user hears would be recorded for 
later playback on demand. Instead of simply conveying the "real" sounds produced 
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by the physical environment, those sounds can be augmented or replaced by other 
audio that is stored in or transmitted to the device. Potential capacities and impair-
ments created for the user of such a device are identified in Figure 2 below.
As can be seen from this example, the model does not yield a  single quantitative 
"impact score" for each of the three levels but rather uses qualitative descriptions 
to capture a complex set of impacts. This model delineates a device ontology that 
can form the basis of further reflection on and analysis of a neuroprosthetic device’s 
impact from both cybernetic, phenomenological, and existentialist perspectives. By 
allowing neuroprosthetic devices with similar characteristics to be identified and 
grouped, it can also serve as the basis of new typologies for neurotechnologies.
Figure 2. The model applied to analyse impacts of a particular auditory neuroprosthesis
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Conclusion
Ongoing advances in neuroprosthetics are expected to yield a diverse range of new 
technologies with the potential to dramatically reshape a  human being’s internal 
mental life, his or her bodily existence and interaction with the environment, and his 
or her participation in social and economic networks and activity. The new capaci-
ties and impairments that such technologies provide may allow human beings to 
physically and virtually inhabit digital ecosystems and interact socially in ways so 
revolutionary that they can best be understood as "posthuman."
The model developed in  this text for understanding these impacts of neuroprosthetic 
devices is already being elaborated in  the specific context of information security to 
provide a framework for future research and practice in that field (Gladden 2015c). By 
further refining and applying the model in other contexts, we hope that it will be pos-
sible for engineers, ethicists, policymakers, and consumers to better understand how 
particular kinds of neuroprosthetic devices may contribute to the development of new 
digital ecosystems that can be a powerful venue for the growth, liberation, and empower-
ment–or oppression and dehumanization–of the human beings of the future.
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